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Drug policy often adopts a threat-based approach to encourage drug users to enter 
treatment. In contrast, incentive-focused approaches offer an alternative way to enhance 
the motivation of drug users and promote effective long-term outcomes. Whilst appealing, 
significant ethical, practical and therapeutic complexities surrounding the use of incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
More carrots, less sticks: the role of incentives in drug treatment  
 
In response to the finding that despite advances in drug treatment, long-term recovery rates 
remain stubbornly low, McKay (1) proposes an alternative vision of drug treatment. He 
argues for a greater focus on incentives to encourage take up and increase the likelihood of 
long-term abstinence.  Acknowledging neuroscientific work on the negative impact of 
addiction on the executive functions of the brain, McKay (1) suggests that there is a 
heightened need for incentives. He proposes that these need to be built into national and 
local drug policies. This commentary reflects critically upon DĐ<ĂǇ ?Ɛ notion of incentive-
based drug treatment. It draws upon political philosophical work on the ethics of incentives, 
specifically the work of Ruth Grant (2). It also engages with socio-legal and criminological 
work on compliance (3, 4). 
 
DĐ<ĂǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ?ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƐŽŵƵĐŚŽĨĚƌƵŐƉŽůŝĐǇŝƐƉƌĞŵŝƐĞĚŽŶ
ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨ ?ƐƚŝĐŬƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞůƵƌĞŽĨ ?ĐĂƌƌŽƚƐ ? ?dǁŽŽďǀŝŽƵƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ
are quasi-compulsory drug treatment for offenders and similar practices for benefit 
claimants. Both approaches are founded on the premise that drug users are incapable of 
exercising moral responsibility and therefore overt mechanisms are needed to regulate their 
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĂĐƚion; for example, 
desistance from crime or seeking paid work. Threats  ? being imprisoned or the loss of state 
financial support  ? are perceived as necessary to channel, and arguably coerce, drug users 
into treatment. These threats loom large to encourage ongoing participation, although this 
may ƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĨŽƌŵĂůĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ŐŽŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
substantive compliance based upon active engagement (4). Securing compliance through 
instrumental mechanisms such as threats may not promote internalised self-regulation in 
the way that normative mechanisms such as a desire to behave in a particular way might 
(3). 
 
&ŽƌDĐ<ĂǇ ? ? ? ?ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďƌŽĂĚůǇĂƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚ
experiences in daily life  ? the activities that bring pleasure, enjoyment, engagement, 
ĞǆĐŝƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŚŽƉĞĨŽƌŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨďĞůŽŶŐŝŶŐĂŶĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ?Ɖ ?y ? ?,ĞƌĞĨĞƌƐ
specifically to employment and housing but we can add voluntary work or leisure activities 
related to music, sport and the arts. These appear to be benign and could, as McKay (1) 
argues make the hard work of recovery more attractive. 
 
'ƌĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐĂƌĞĂĨŽƌŵŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇ
as an alternative to coercion and persuasion because individuals choose whether to accept 
the incentives on offer. Examining this further we start to reflect upon the context in which 
they are offered. Limitations of space preclude a detailed analysis but we can raise two 
important questions here. The first to ask how incentive-focused drug treatment might 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞ ?ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ?'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚĂĚĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂĐŚƌŽŶŝĐĂŶĚƌĞůĂƉƐŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚ
those in treatment might struggle to remain abstinent. Will incentives serve as a form of 
 ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ? ?ƚŽďĞƌĞŵŽǀĞĚŝĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐŶŽƚĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐŝŶĚƌƵŐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ? 
The second is to ask about the motivations of those entering, and then remaining in, drug 
treatment. Incentives are intentionally designed to increase motivation through offering 
rewards for acting in a certain way. Like threats, they encourage extrinsic motivation which 
may lead to formal (potentially short-lived) compliance rather than substantive compliance 
which is necessary for desistence from drug use. McSweeney et al. (5) explored the 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚŽƐĞ ?ĐŽĞƌĐĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŽĚƌƵŐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚǀŝĂĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞ
ǁŚŽ ?ĐŚŽƐĞ ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƚŽĚƌƵŐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ?&ŽƌďŽƚŚŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?ƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů
influences (for example, family, friends, employers and social services) was important. 
Short-term treatment outcomes for both groups were broadly similar but little is known 
about the longer-term impact of using external motivators. There is scope for further 
research to establish a dynamic understanding of drug users ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐĚƌƵŐ
treatment, how they shift over time, and the link between motivation  ? in its different 
forms  ? and treatment outcomes, particular long-term ones. 
 
McKay (1) ends the article by stating that implementing his recommendations would be 
challenging. Not least this is because it requires a rethinking of the current threat-based 
approach to drug treatment. As McKay (1) notes, an incentive-based approach requires 
financial investment and securing local and national support, both of which are difficult to 
secure in an era of austerity and when drug users are so highly stigmatised (6). In sum, it is a 
more problematic approach than it first appears and needs to be accompanied by 
consideration of the ethical, practical and therapeutic complexities raised when proposing 
the use of incentives in the context of drug treatment. 
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